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A SURVEY OF CHANGES IN UNITED
STATES LITIGATION
JACK B. WEINSTEINt
The United States has a reputation abroad for supercharged
mass litigation driven by powerful plaintiff attorneys. The
assumption of big business is that this litigation, while of limited
benefit to some consumers in deterring dangerous conduct and
compensating for injury, is detrimental to commercial and
financial institutions and the development of new technology.
It cannot be denied that United States litigators-both for
plaintiffs and defendants-have done well financially. They
have also kept our judges and the press both busy and
entertained with complex and interesting litigation.
Some would argue that enrichment of the bar and
amusement of the judiciary and public are not sufficient reasons
for lawsuits. In any event, I submit that our legal system
generally provides benefits commensurate with the costs.' The
structural advantages of plaintiffs are overstated, and recent
modifications have generally favored defendants.
Changes in our litigation system can be relevant to those
outside our borders. While expansion of law firms and commerce
on a worldwide scale may tend to eliminate some variations in
the legal cultures of different nations,2 choice of forum and choice
t Senior Judge, United States District Court, Eastern District of New York. I
appreciate the suggestions of Daniel Dockery, Esq., Edward Wesely, Esq., David P.
Olner, and Professor Margaret Berger. This article is based on a speech given at
the ALI-ABA Course of Study: United States and International Litigation and
Dispute Resolution, held in London, England on April 10-12, 2002.
1 See THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL RuSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW § 2.2
(2001). See generally CARL T. BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA
(2001). But see John L. Warden, Frivolous Publication, THE AM. LAW., Jan. 2002, at
63 (criticizing Bogus' conclusions that lawsuits are beneficial).
2 See Peter D. Zeughauser, The New World Order, THE AM. LAW., Jan. 2002, at
49 ("A handful of firms are on the brink of global domination .... ."); cf Anthony E.
Davis, 'MJP' (Multijurisdictional Practice)-Down 'to the Wire, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 7,
2002, at 3 (discussing opposition to proposals to permit non-local attorneys to
practice).
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of law will remain critical to potential litigants.
Since so many internationally tinged transactions end up in
our courts, it may be useful for non-American lawyers to have
some understanding of trends within our system of law.
Let me draw your attention to a few major topographical
features as we take a quick flight over the terrain of American
litigation. Some recurring areas of change and tension in the
United States are: (1) battles for substantive and procedural
advantages between putative defendants and prospective
plaintiffs (and among their attorneys); (2) contests between the
states and the federal government for control of aspects of our
legal system; (3) shifts between private and public law; (4) the
continued magnetism of our courts for suits originating abroad;
and (5) differences between more conservative and liberal judges,
legislatures, and academics over litigation. I will also touch on
the ad hoc administrative system devised to compensate those
injured by the September 11th attack on the World Trade Center
since it illustrates our reluctance to abandon the present tort
system.
Our law is not static. The moving tectonic plates of political
and social change alter the landscape. To those abroad, our
system may seem fixed. For us, on the ground, it seems to be
constantly shaking with volcanic eruptions and earthquakes.
I. DEFENDANTS V. PLAINTIFFS
Legislatures and courts are constantly altering substantive
and procedural legal rules. These changes often affect the
relative litigation strengths of plaintiffs compared to those of
defendants. Recently these developments have tended to favor
defendants.
Insurance companies and corporate interests have waged a
sustained campaign through advertising, political efforts, and
other activities to convince jurors, voters, and lawmakers that
plaintiffs are abusing the system.3  This message is often
exaggerated, but it has prompted legislators to somewhat
tighten the substantive and procedural rules for tort recovery.
Most of this "reform" has occurred in state legislatures.
3 See, e.g., Bob Van Voris, Smokers' Suits Seen as Facing Juror Doubt, NAT'L
L.J., Mar. 18, 2002, at Al (stating that prospective jurors' views of appropriateness
of tobacco litigation is negative where advertising is by defendants, but positive
where advertising is by plaintiffs' attorneys).
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In states like New York, for example, it is harder than it
once was to avoid the limits of workers compensation by suing a
third party and having that party implead the employer. 4 In
some states, punitive damages have been abolished or limited
and caps have been placed on what a plaintiff can recover.5
Congress has also participated. For instance, enforcement of
federal securities law by private attorneys has been made more
difficult.6
The 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, widely adopted
by the states, opened the courts to plaintiffs, making recoveries
much easier. In the last few years, both amendments to the
Rules and their interpretations have somewhat closed the door
to the courthouse. The tide does not flow all one way. The
ENRON scandal may, for instance, lead to a shift towards easing
private suits on behalf of shareholders. 7
Some procedural developments have favored plaintiffs.
Congress has encouraged certain types of cases by permitting
recoveries of substantial legal fees by successful plaintiffs.8
Recovery of fees in civil rights9 and false advertising cases, 10 qui
tam claims by private litigants based upon frauds on the
government," and treble damage claims, as in federal fraud
based statutes under our Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act (RICO) actions, 12 have encouraged the plaintiff
bar's private attorney general role.
4 See N.Y. WORKERS' COMP. LAW § 13 (McKinney 1992).
5 See, e.g., Berry v. Loiseau, 614 A.2d 414, 437-38 (Conn. 1992) (limiting
punitive damages to plaintiffs litigation expenses less taxable costs); ALA. CODE § 6-
11-21 (1975); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3358 (Deering 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 400.0238
(West 2002).
6 See Miranda S. Schiller & Haron W. Murage, Reforms Raise Hurdle in
Securities Class Actions, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 14, 2002, at 1; see also Edward Labaton,
Courts on Trial Symposium Closing Remarks, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 1111 (1998).
7 See Bob Herbert, Enron and the Gramms, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2002, at A29
(warning against continued deregulation).
8 See David W. Garland & Vanessa M. Kelly, Awards of Attorneys' Fees in
Statutory Civil Rights Claims, ALI-ABA Course of Study: United States and
International Litigation and Dispute Resolution: Current Developments and their
Impact on U.S. and European Companies, Insurers, and Lawyers (April 10-12,
2002).
9 See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1994).
10 See Blue Cross and Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 190 F.
Supp. 407, 414-25 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
11 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (1994).
12 See 18 U.S.C.§ 1964(c) (1994).
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There is still a strong policy of keeping the courts open to
those with private grievances. Despite restrictions, the number
of civil filings has remained relatively constant. 13 Payments of
attorneys' fees by plaintiffs who lose to defendants, even when
cases seem frivolous, have not yet become the rule.14 In this
respect we remain reluctant to follow the English practice of
broadly shifting legal fees to the loser, a change that would
discourage litigation.'5
The temperament of judges and juries varies by region. In
some areas of the South, for instance, courts are known for
returning generous verdicts favoring plaintiffs in product
liability cases. 16 The divergences in court approaches by region
and between federal and state court systems increase difficulties
of the courts and parties in coordinating sprawling litigations to
achieve a uniform and reasonable national result. 17
Procedures have been modified by the courts in ways that
make litigation more difficult and less appealing to claimants,
particularly in mass cases. Examples include two recent
Supreme Court decisions in the vexing asbestos saga, Amchem
Products, Inc. v. WindsorI8 and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.19
These cases could have been decided on narrow conflict of
interest grounds based on overreaching of a few attorneys to
13 See National Center for State Courts, Examining the Work of the State
Courts, 1999-2000 Cases Filed in State Court, at http://www.ncsc.dni.usl
divisions/research/csp/csp-stat0l.html (last visited July 2, 2002) (chart showing
relatively stable number of state court civil filings over past decade); THE THIRD
BRANCH (Newsletter of the Federal Courts), Mar. 2002, at 6, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/mar02ttb/maro2.html (discussing the slight decrease in
federal personal injury cases as a result of discouragement of such cases in the
federal courts); Mark P. Goodman & Robert D. Goodman, Plaintiffs' Bar Now
Opposes Unimpaired Asbestos Suits, NAT'L L. J., Apr. 1, 2002, at B14-16 (discussing
the shifting of asbestos claims from federal to state courts).
14 But see FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2) (stating that court may order party to pay
opponent's attorney's fees if the party has engaged in frivolous or harassing
litigation).
15 See John Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured
Person's Access to Justice, AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1570-77 (1993).
16 See Robert Pear, Class-Action Bill Favorable to Business Passes House, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 14, 2002, at A28 ("Jefferson County, Miss., one of the poorest counties
in one of the nation's poorest states, . . . has become a popular venue for lawyers
suing makers of prescription drugs, cigarettes, lead paint and asbestos products.").
17 See JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION 24-
26 (1995).
18 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
19 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
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increase their fees and the recoveries of their clients. Instead,
the Court used language interpreted by many of the lower
courts-in my opinion wrongly-to severely limit class action
settlements of product liability cases. 20  In a recent case,
Stephenson v. Dow Chemical Co., the Second Circuit reopened
the Agent Orange case to permit new claims more than a decade
after the parties thought they had bought peace by a class action
settlement.21
As a result of these anti-settlement decisions, a valuable tool
for peaceably resolving massive disputes through class action
settlements at relatively low transactional costs has been
somewhat crippled. Why would the tobacco companies and
others want to settle, terminating many individual and class
actions, if large payments cannot guarantee an end to festering
litigation? Some believe that these adverse class action decisions
will discourage mass litigation because plaintiffs' attorneys will
hesitate to sue when they cannot obtain low-cost settlements.
The Supreme Court has increased the trial court's powers to
winnow out poor cases and to avoid jury trials. One device has
been the expansion of summary judgments favoring defendants.
Another has been the development of the gate-keeping function
of the judge to exclude expert testimony relied upon by plaintiffs
that does not measure up to appropriate standards of science
and rationality. 22 Moreover, appellate courts are more likely to
20 See, e.g., Steve Lohr, Federal Judge Deals Setback to Microsoft in Private
Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2002, at C1 (discussing a case in which proposed
settlement of a class action suit against Microsoft was disallowed because of its
anti-competitive effect). For the enormous costs of continuing asbestos cases which
might have been limited by settlement or other devices, see, for example, STEPHEN
CARROLL ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, ASBESTOS LITIGATION COSTS
AND COMPENSATION: AN INTERIM REPORT (2002); GRIFFIN BELL, ASBESTOS
LITIGATION AND JUDICIAL LEADERSHIP: THE COURT'S DUTY TO HELP SOLVE THE
ASBESTOS LITIGATION CRISIS (2002); Mark A. Behrens, Some Proposals For Courts
Interested in Helping Sick Claimants and Solving Serious Problems in Asbestos
Litigation, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 331 (2002).
21 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001).
22 See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 143-49 (1999) (concluding
that trial judge must determine whether specialized evidence is reliable based on
standards of the relevant discipline); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142-43
(1997) (discussing the appropriate standard of review in determining admissibility
of expert testimony); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993)
(stating that trial judge must ensure both the reliability and relevance of all
scientific evidence); David Hechler, Courts Toss Out Expert Testimony, NAT'L L.J.
Jan, 7, 2002, at A20. District courts have applied tougher standards to keep out
expert testimony in business disputes, generally favoring defendants. See id. at
20021
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reverse jury verdicts favoring plaintiffs than those favoring
defendants. 23
Lower courts as well as the Supreme Court have
increasingly construed congressional statutes to preclude
enforcement by individual suits of those injured, leaving
enforcement to ill-financed regulatory agencies, which will often
allow defendants violating the law to escape control.24
II. NATIONAL V. STATE
Since the Civil War, control over the law has shifted away
from the states and towards the federal government. That
tendency accelerated during the depression and then again after
World War II. Now there are signs of a swing back towards state
control.
A major move towards national dominion was accomplished
through congressional expansion of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).25  National statutes
targeting discrimination based on sex, 26 race,27 age, 28 and
A20. See generally Gerald J. Flattman, Jr. & Krista M. Rycroft, Jury's Role
Shrinks in Patent Litigation, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 21, 2002, at C1.
23 See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal from Jury or Judge
Trial: Defendants'Advantage, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 125, 138 (2001) (stating that
appellate courts are more inclined to overturn plaintiffs verdicts because of the
perceived pro-plaintiff bias of juries); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg,
Anti-Plaintiff Bias in the Federal Appellate Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 128 (2000)
(same).
24 See Olmsted v. Pruco Life Ins. Co., 283 F.3d 429, 434 (2d Cir. 2002) ("Past
decisions reflecting judicial willingness to 'make effective [statutory] purpose' in the
context of implied rights of action belong to an 'ancient regime.' (quoting Alexander
v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001))).
25 See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994); see also Mark Hamblett, Suit Seeking Interest on
Benefits Revived: ERISA Does Not Bar Relief for Unjustified Delays, N.Y.L.J., Jan
14, 2002, at 1 (discussing a Second Circuit case in which interest on late payments
was not recoverable under ERISA).
26 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994); see also Dianna P. Scott, Latest
Developments in Sexual Harassment and Discrimination in the United States, ALI-
ABA Course of Study: United States and International Litigation and Dispute
Resolution: Current Developments and their Impact on U.S. and European
Companies, Insurers, and Lawyers (April 10-12, 2002).
27 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994); see also Joanna L. Grossman, Making a
Federal Case Out of It: Section 1981 and At-Will Employment, 67 BROOK. L. REV.
329, 329 (2001) (stating that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1974 "prohibit[s]
employers from taking any racially motivated adverse employment action"); Scott,
supra note 26.
28 See 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994); see also David W. Garland et al., Age
Discrimination and Employee Downsizing, ALI-ABA Course of Study: United States
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disability29 have also served to nationalize a great deal of
employer-employee relations; so too, have the National Labor
Relations Act3 0 and a national commission to provide safety
protections for workers, OSHA. 31
By contrast, recent strongly criticized (perhaps too strongly)
limitations by the Supreme Court on broad powers of Congress
to regulate under the Commerce Clause and Fourteenth
Amendment of our Constitution have begun to affect litigation.32
The cases banning suits based on federal law on violence against
women 33 or against states for various forms of discrimination 34
have limited the ability of plaintiffs to pursue certain actions in
federal court, but most of these claims are cognizable in some
form under state law.
Shifting centrifugal and centripetal forces mean that
potential litigants may have to deal with fifty-one rules of law
and International Litigation and Dispute Resolution: Current Developments and
their Impact on U.S. and European Companies, Insurers, and Lawyers (April 10-12,
2002).
29 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994); see also Frank C. Morris, Jr. & Teresa L.
Jakubrowski, The Americans with Disability Act, ALI-ABA Course of Study: United
States and International Litigation and Dispute Resolution: Current Developments
and their Impact On U.S. and European Companies, Insurers, and Lawyers (April
10-12, 2002).
30 See 29 U.S.C. § 151, 152 (1994).
31 See 29 U.S.C. § 657 (1994).
32 See, e.g., JOHN T. NOONAN, NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER (2002)
(criticizing the Court's restrictions on congressional powers); GARRETT EPPS, To AN
UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 226-41 (2001) (discussing passage
of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to reverse Supreme Court views); Larry D.
Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV.
4, 169 (2002) (pronouncing that "[tihe Supreme Court has made its grab for power");
Robert C. Post, Remarks at the 2001 Induction Ceremony of the American Academy
of Arts and Sciences (Oct. 13, 2001), in BULL. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI., WINTER 2002,
at 32 (stating that "that limits of congressional power are now uncertain"); see also
ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, Report of Committee on Civil
Rights: Salvaging Civil Rights Undermined by the Supreme Court: Extending the
Protection by Federal Civil Rights Laws in Light of Restrictive Supreme Court
Decisions, 56 THE REC. 510 (2001); Linda Greenhouse, Judicial Restraint: The
Imperial Presidency vs. the Imperial Judiciary, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2002, at WK3;
Sen. Charles Schumer and Chief Judge J. Harvey Wilkinson III, Congress and the
Court, AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCIENCES, Summer 2002, at 37 (panel discussion with
Jesse Choper, Linda Greenhouse, Abner J. Mikva, Nelson W. Polsby, and Robert C.
Post on choice of judges and effect on state-federal and congressional powers).
33 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (holding that a
federal civil remedy for assault cannot be sustained under the Commerce Clause nor
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
34 See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 78-79 (2000) (addressing
specifically age discrimination).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
and administration rather than just one. The conflicts of law
problems grow apace, making national litigation more difficult.
As I have already suggested, there is a sharp debate
developing about whether attorneys admitted in one state or
country should be able to practice more freely elsewhere in
national and international litigation.3 5 A relative openness for
lawyers seeking admission to federal courts on a pro hoc vice
basis addresses the problem in a limited way. It is my hope that
these rules will be extended to foreign attorneys so we can
eventually recognize an international bar for private litigation.
III. PUBLIC V. PRIVATE AND JUDICIAL V. NON-JUDICIAL
Public suits by both government officials and private
attorneys to prevent private abuse are increasingly encouraged.
The Supreme Court has even recently allowed our Equal
Employment Opportunity commission to ignore an employer-
employee arbitration agreement and to sue the employer in the
public interest for discrimination against its employees. 36
There has been a discernable shift towards public criminal
and administrative law and away from private tort law as tools
of deterrence and compensation. 37 Criminal law statutes now
provide for compulsory restitution,38 leaving little for tort
recovery in some major fraud cases. Agencies such as the
Federal Trade Commission, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and the Federal Drug Administration are
35 See State Move to Ease Multijurisdictional Rules to Let Lawyers Work
Temporarily Interstate, U.S. LAw WEEK, Jan. 22, 2002, at 2428; see also Martha
Neil, Easing Up: Proposed Changes in the ABA Model Rules Would Recognize the
Reality of Multijurisdictional Practice, 88 A.B.A. J. 47 (2002) (stating that "clients'
needs are becoming increasingly national and international in scope").
36 See E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279 (2002); Robert S. Greenberger,
Supreme Court Gives Workers Legal Options: EEOC May Pursue Relief Even When
Employee Signs Arbitration Pact, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2002, at B14; Linda
Greenhouse, Justices Limit Reach of Arbitration Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2002, at
A17 (announcing that "[tihe court says an agency can represent workers who waive
the right to sue").
37 See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Compensation for Mass Private Derelicts:
Evolving Roles of Administrative, Criminal, and Tort Law, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 947
(2001); Today's News, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 24, 2002, at 1 (announcing the formation of a
multi-state task force to investigate possible securities violations by investment
banks); cf Richard L. Marcus, Reform Through Rulemaking? (Mar. 16, 2002)
(unpublished manuscript on file with author).
38 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (2002), MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24 (Lexis 2001);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-28-1 (Michie 1998).
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increasingly utilizing disgorgement orders to compensate
victims, obviating some of the need for private class actions. 39
Administrative requirements that manufacturers report
problems in automobiles, toys, and a myriad of other consumer
products and services, as well as other administrative
regulations, reduce the risk of injury.40 In auto safety design
and many other areas, this is a far better way than private law
suits to protect consumers in our complex society. Court review
of such administrative decisions is limited,41 though increasing. 42
One of the risks of reliance on public controls is that budgets
may be cut, and with the new Administration's commitment to
the ideology of deregulation, protections may be reduced. This
danger is partly mitigated by the ability of the states to regulate
independently of the federal government, where the latter has
not preempted the field.43 In a backlash against Washington's
trend towards more business friendly policies, some states have
brought new suits and enacted new protective laws.44
The state attorneys general do not automatically fall in line
with national administrative law or policy. Some of them, for
example, refused to settle (as the feds did) antitrust claims
against Microsoft, a major computer producer. 45 By contrast,
39 See Weinstein, supra note 37, at 952.
40 See UNITED STATES CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMM'N, 107th Cong., 2000
Annual Report to Congress (stating that reporting requirements and other
regulations have contributed to a thirty percent decline in rates of deaths and
injuries related to consumer products since the Consumer Product Safety
Commission was founded).
41 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984) (establishing the process by which courts review administrative
agencies' construction of statutes).
42 See Jack B. Weinstein & Catherine Wimberley, Secrecy in Law and Science,
23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2001) (noting that the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) and other laws require agencies to divulge information).43 See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A
Public-Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 630-31 (2001) (noting the
"willingness of some states to extend environmental regulation at a time of federal
inaction.. ."); James Traub, The Attorney General Goes to War, N.Y. TIMES
MAGAZINE, June 16, 2002, at 38.
44 See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, States Seek to Counter U.S. Deregulation, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan 13, 2002, at 23 (acknowledging state expansion of law enforcement
capabilities in response to lax enforcement at the federal level).
45 See Jason Lynch, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Role of State
Attorneys General in Multistage Litigation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1998, 2030 (2001)
(establishing that in the Microsoft antitrust case, states acted pursuant to federal
law); Leonard Orland, The Microsoft End Game, 34 CONN. L. REV. 221, 230 n.53
(2001) (noting that nine Attorneys General refused to sign a consent decree);
20021
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state attorneys general settled state claims against tobacco
companies for hundreds of billions of dollars when Congress was
unable to reach agreement. 46
The rules of preemption may severely limit state regulation
and private suits after a protective federal rule, regulation, or
statute takes effect. The Tobacco cases are an example.47
Although settlements of state attorneys general with major
producers did regulate the conduct of cigarette advertising to a
significant degree, federal statutory administrative
requirements of warnings on cigarettes have largely protected
the manufacturers from civil actions claiming fraud in failing to
warn, and prevented the states from enacting more rigorous
control. Additionally, the development of protected commercial
speech concepts by the Supreme Court has further reduced the
ability of states to regulate how dangerous products are
advertised.48
As previously noted, there is some resistance to a conflicts of
law approach that permits application of one rule of law
throughout the nation in private lawsuits.49 Yet, in bankruptcy
settlements-a form of public administration-such as those
precipitated by asbestos injury cases, a fairly uniform national
Labaton, supra note 44, at 23 (declaring that state legislation and state-initiated
lawsuits represent a "public break with Washington").
46 See generally Lynch, supra note 45. Private litigants are also increasingly
using state courts to resolve problems of national dimension. See Elizabeth J.
Cabraser, Class Action Update 2001: Mass Tort Trends, Choice of Law, Rule 23(f)
Appeals, and Proposed Amendments to Rule 23, ALI-ABA Course of Study: United
States and International Litigation and Dispute Resolution: Current Developments
and their Impact on U.S. and European Companies, Insurers, and Lawyers (April
10-12, 2002) ("The 1990s saw a trend toward increased filing of large class actions,
often nationwide in scope, in the state courts.").
47 See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 178 F.
Supp. 2d 198, 262-65 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that federal law preempts state
regulation of the advertising and promotion of tobacco products, but does not
preempt all claims based on deceitful practices); cf. Burke v. Dow Chemical Co., 797
F. Supp. 1128, 1139-41 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting that federal regulation of pesticides
preempts claims that pesticides were mislabeled to the extent manufacturers
complied with federal labeling requirements, but does not preempt claims based on
failure to warn).
48 See Lorillard Tobacco, Inc. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 551 (2001) (holding that
state regulations banning outdoor advertisement of certain tobacco products
violated the First Amendment).
49 See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995)
(rejecting the possibility that negligence laws of the fifty states and the District of
Columbia could be collapsed into a single rule).
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consensus tort law matrix is being utilized to divide some sixty
billion dollars of potential recoveries. 50 Some twenty billion
dollars of plaintiff attorney fees will be allowed by generous state
laws-an amount that seems somewhat excessive. A foreign
entity buying an American firm may find itself drawn into the
quicksand of asbestos, putting at risk its main business. 51
As more and more potential defendants are forced into
bankruptcy as a result of asbestos litigation, it is apparent that
there will not be enough money to compensate all of the
prospective claimants who are expected to fall ill (or who think
they will become ill from asbestos) from now to the middle of this
century.5 2 Struggles have intensified among members of the
trial bar to divide the limited funds. The division between the
most seriously injured and those with almost no health problems
is being resolved by negotiation among plaintiffs' counsel with
little input by courts or defendants. As a result of this private
triaging by plaintiffs' attorneys, serious lung cancer claimants
will probably receive higher awards in proportion to those with
only benign pleural symptoms. 53
Probably favorable towards defendants is the enormous
move towards arbitration. Employee-employer disputes,
litigation by customers against their brokers, intercompany
claims by producers and insurance companies, and the like are
now less likely to be found in our courts.
Many of our former judges and law professors have become
influential in their new roles as mediators and arbitrators in
national and international matters. Awards of hundreds of
millions of dollars suggest, however, that arbitration is not an
entirely safe refuge for prospective defendants. 54 Yet, by shifting
50 See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 878 F. Supp. 473, 495-97
(E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 1995) (describing how the matrix operates); Lisa Girion,
Firms Hit Hard as Asbestos Claims Rise: Courts Recent Jury Awards Underscore
Commercial Disaster's Continuing Toll, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2001, at Al ("U.S.
insurers are expected to cover $60 billion [in asbestos-related payouts], for which
the industry may face a shortfall of as much as $33 billion.").
51 See Elizabeth Olson, ABB Expects to Report a Loss Over Asbestos Cases, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 31, 2002, at Wl.
52 See id.
53 See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., No. 90 Civ. 3973, 2001 WL
1464362, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2001) (noting a continuing rise in claims and
decline in funds available to pay claims).
54 See, e.g., NYSE Panel Orders $429M Award; Largest Ever Against a
Stockbroker, NEWSDAY, Dec. 27, 2001, at A37.
20021 389
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some arbitration costs to plaintiffs, thus reducing the freedom
claimants have had to sue at almost no risk or costs to
themselves, and by avoiding juries (and in some cases punitive
damages), arbitration has become ever more attractive to
potential defendants.
Courts themselves have utilized court annexed arbitration
and mediation through panels of volunteers. Partly as a result
of these techniques, the ratio of jury trials to judgments has
continued to decrease to just a few percentage points. Civil jury
trials, and criminal jury trials as well, are no longer a significant
aspect of federal court proceedings in the United States.55
The increasing prevalence of mandatory international
arbitration clauses and various international forums for certain
types of disputes have also reduced the number of defendants
that can be sued in United States courts.56
IV. AMERICAN COURTS AS A MAGNET FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND
OTHER SUITS
The threat of prosecution in United States courts for civil
rights violations and other torts throughout the world is
substantial. It may show some slight signs of abatement as
Congress recognizes that Americans may also be sued in courts
abroad57 (which partly explains the United States' rejection of an
international criminal court).58 Nevertheless, as recent class
55 Compare What Has Contributed to a Decade of Increasing Civil Case Filings,
33 THIRD BRANCH (Newsletter of the Federal Courts), Dec. 2001, at 7 (increased
civil case filings in federal court) with Jack B. Weinstein, The Restatement of Torts
and the Courts, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1439, 1446 (2001) (demonstrating a decrease in
jury trials).
56 But see Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 113 F.
Supp. 2d 345, 367-68 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (denying summary judgment motion brought
by British holding company because there was a genuine issue of fact as to its
responsibility for its American subsidiary's acts); Juan Zuniga, When is a
Corporation liable for acts of subs abroad?, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 11, 2002, at B13
(explaining the courts' increased exercise of power over parent corporations for
foreign subsidiaries acts).
57 See, e.g., Commercial Arbitration and Mediation Center For the Americas
(CAMCA): Mediation and Arbitration Rules, 35 I.L.M. 1541, 1544 (1996) (noting
that any investment dispute between a North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) state and a citizen of a NAFTA signatory is subject to arbitration between
the investor and the state); Edmund L. Andrews, Trade Panel Says Europe Can
Impose Penalties on U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2002, at Al, A6 (noting that the
"ruling's biggest effect is likely to be on a handful of major American
manufacturers").
58 See Barbara Crossette, World Court For War Crimes Inches Closer To
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actions against German and Swiss entities settling huge claims
for slave labor and other Nazi atrocities indicate, our courts
continue to be a magnet for human rights suits.59
Forum non conveniens and deference doctrines that could
dilute our private law suits have not been popular with the
American judiciary. In general, our courts will defer only if
there is substantial assurance that the foreign system will
supply an effective remedy.60 Our experience in sending the
Bhopal disaster to India's courts for quasi-administrative control
where, reportedly, compensation to those injured has been too
long deferred, has not produced confidence in foreign justice in
some countries among our judges.61
We continue to provide restrictive limits on personal
jurisdiction that grant some protection for foreigners against
being dragged into our courts. 62 Since the foreign approach
Reality, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2002, at A8.
The Bush administration, breaking with European and NATO allies,
strongly opposes the court and has vowed never to send the treaty to the
Senate for ratification. The treaty, adopted by a conference of nations in
Rome in 1998, was signed by the United States in the waning days of the
Clinton administration over the objections of the Pentagon and
conservatives in Congress who feared that Americans would be easy
targets as they carried out missions abroad.
Id. But cf Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, art. 2
(Dec. 16, 1970) (obligating signatories to severely punish hijackers), available at
http://www.undcp.org/terrorisconvention-aircraft_seizure.html.
59 See, e.g., Ukrainian Natl Assn. of Jewish Former Prisoners of Concentration
Camps & Ghettos v. United States, 182 F. Supp. 2d 305, 311 (E.D.N.Y. 2001)
(allowing Holocaust survivors' lawsuit against United States to proceed); Francine
Parnes, Fighting On: Legal Actions by Nazi Victims Seeking Compensation Meet
With Mixed Results, A.B.A. J., Mar. 2002, at 20; Burt Neuborne, Preliminary
Reflections on Aspects of Holocaust-Era Litigation in American Courts, in Institute
for Law and Economic Policy Conference on Litigation in a Free Society (2002).
60 See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 Civ. 8386, 2002 WL 319887,
at *8-13 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002). An earlier dismissal on forum non conveniens
grounds was reversed by the Second Circuit. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 226 F.3d 88, 108 (2d. Cir. 2000). See generally Aric K Short, Is the Alien Tort
Statute Sacrosanct? Retaining Forum Non Conveniens in Human Rights Litigation,
33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1001 (2001); MARTIN FLUMENBAUM & BRAD S. KARP,
Forum Non Conveniens, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 10, 2002, at 3.
61 See JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDMIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION 177-
78 n.3 (1995).
62 See In re DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. 552, 571 (1992) ("Local businesses, or
foreign businesses whose products normally have no contact with the United States,
may arguably rely on the fact that they never expected to have any dealings that
affect New Yorkers."); Jack B. Weinstein, Mass Tort Jurisdiction and Choice of Law
in a Multinational World Communicating by Extraterrestrial Satellites, 37
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 145, 148 (2001) ("Some [state jurisdictional] statutes providing
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seems to be more top-down administrative rather than our more
bottom-up court-centered litigation, this limit on personal
jurisdiction disfavors proceedings favoring the injured.6 3 There
is a slight tendency to rely upon international human rights law
to check our own courts. In capital punishment, immigration
rights, and now in the Afghanistan prisoner rights issues, we
begin to see problems of our courts with foreign and
international substantive and procedural law lurking on the
horizon.64
V. CONSERVATIVE V. LIBERAL COURTS
United States courts, particularly appellate courts, have
become more conservative-i.e., defense oriented-as a result of
the Reagan-Bush appointments. Clinton tended to be a centrist
who left the balance much as it was. The close balance in the
Supreme Court, where so many critical cases are 5-4, epitomizes
the split and explains some of the sharp confirmation struggles
in the Senate.65
As older, more liberal judges depart, the conservative cast of
the federal bench grows. Culturally, the United States has
shifted toward Republicanism in the south and elsewhere,
moving away from populism-even in areas which are strongly
democrat-as reflected by the widespread public acceptance of
welfare "reform."66 The move from secular rationalism toward
religious faith presages less reliance on litigation and
government controls because of the belief that God, rather than
for nationwide service may not reach foreign national defendants residing abroad.").
63 See Jack B. Weinstein, Compensating Large Numbers of People for Inflicted
Harms, 11 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 165, 177 (2001).
64 See Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 604 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that
United States immigration law should be interpreted to comport with international
common law favoring family preservation); Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887.
65 See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, First Punch in the Revived Bench-Tipping Brawl,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2002, at 35 (There has been an "escalation in the long running
partisan and ideological fight between presidents and senators over the shape of the
federal courts.... In the 12 years of Republican rule under Mr. Reagan and the
First President Bush, the courts were tilted distinctly rightward .... President Bill
Clinton... generally named moderates who would be palatable to Republicans.").
66 See, e.g., Kathleen A. Kost & Frank W. Munger, Fooling All of the People
Some of the Time: 1990's Welfare Reform and the Exploitation of American Value, 4
VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 3, 27 (noting that welfare reform advocates have shifted the
"emphasis of public discourse away from poverty, to the deviant behavior of
recipients").
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government administrators, will guide us. 67
Even if our society immediately were to become markedly
less conservative, the make-up and decisional bent of the bench
would not change rapidly.68 There is a "cyclical lag" that delays
the impact of cultural and political alterations on the make-up of
the judiciary. This is but one aspect of the conservatism of the
law and its resistance to new views.
VI. THE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIMS' COMPENSATION FUND
Let me touch upon the Victims' Compensation Fund and
procedure created by Congress following the September 11, 2001
attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. 69 In a
sudden outpouring of compassion for the victims and their
families and fear that major elements of the airline industry
would be driven into bankruptcy by private tort litigation,
Congress created an ad hoc non-reviewable administrative
system of compensation for what will be some 3,000 wrongful
death cases and a few hundred personal injury cases. It is
available to those who agree not to sue under the private tort
system. 70 The 9-11 Act, as it is called, seems fair to me; the
regulations and administration of the talented Special Master,
Kenneth Feinberg, are sound and consonant with the statute.
Although it will probably cost the public about five billion dollars
if almost all claimants opt for it, there are many-particularly
the more well-to-do-who complain that their compensation will
not be enough. Attorneys will obtain negligible fees under the
Act. 1
67 See, e.g., Teresa Watanabe, Church-State Line is Still Blurred After Rulings;
Religion: Decisions on the Pledge of Allegiance and School Vouchers Continue a
Tradition of Debate As Old As the Nation Itself, L.A. TIMES, July 3, 2002, at A20
("Some experts also suggest that the long national trend toward 'secular
individualism' has run its course, creating a sense of fragmentation that has led
many Americans to long for more community.").
68 In any event, individual decisions often defy political leanings. See, e.g.,
Michael Dorf, It's Not About Politics, COL. L. SCHOOL REP., Fall 2001, at 30.
69 Victims of Terrorism Relief Act, P.L. 107-34, 115 Stat. 2427 (2002);
September 11 Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 28 C.F.R. § 104 (2002).
70 But see William Glaberson, 4 Suits Filed Despite Call for Restraint by
Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2002, at A13. Compare Williams Glaberson, Lawyers
Said to Back Compensation Plan to Polish Image, N.Y. TIMES, JAN. 14, 2002, at A9
(noting that many members of plaintiffs' bar support Compensation Fund) with Lee
S. Kreindler, WTC Victims' Compensation: A Sad Disappointment, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 4,
2002, at 3 (criticizing the fund).
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The Act is supposed to somewhat mimic the tort system.
This creates problems of variations among the laws of the states
where the dead and injured resided regarding liability, set-offs
for collateral source recoveries, and conflicting claims of various
family members. States differ, for example, on whether a
decedent's unmarried partner-homosexual or heterosexual-
can recover on a claim of wrongful death.71 These variations
make it somewhat difficult to create a national compensation
system.
One academic has posited that if we are trying to
compensate all those injured by the September 11th attack, why
should we not duplicate this system for all those injured in
product liability, auto accidents, medical malpractice, and other
areas?72
The answer: Politicians will never duplicate this September
11th system to replace our tort law. The tort system will remain
our primary method of compensating the injured (apart from
workers compensation for job related injuries) for various
reasons: (1) It is less expensive since many of the injured never
sue or do not recover. (2) It provides the model of a jury system
(even in non-jury cases) which can make distinctions based upon
wide disparities in incomes and capacity to sue, without
requiring the legislature to explicitly recognize gross differences
between the economic opportunities of the haves and the have-
nots in our society. (3) It is flexible enough to meet new
situations without new statutes, thus allowing subtle shifts in
the definition of duties in our constantly changing complex real
world.73 (4) There is an enormous politically powerful litigation
industry that would be largely superfluous. Lastly, (5) The
bottom-up system of private litigation with a lawyer standing by
71 Compare Raum v. Rest. Assoc., Inc., 675 N.Y.S. 2d 343, 344 (1st Dep't 1998)
(holding that state may exclude unmarried partners of a decedent from bringing a
wrongful death action) with Thompson v. Dewey's South Royalton, Inc., 733 A.2d
65, 69 (Vt. 1999) (holding that father, child, live-in partner, and partner's child all
had a right to recover loss of means of support from bars, their owners and
employees after decedent drank excessively and died as a result of injuries
sustained in a car crash).
72 See Peter H. Schuck, Equity for All Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2001, at
A35.
73 See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third)
and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 723 (2001)
(explaining that the tort system fills the "default norm that the civil justice system
will provided a remedy for every wrong.").
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his or her client is something that appeals to our sense of justice
even if the paradigm is somewhat tarnished.74
Feints in the direction of transcending the tort system
through mechanisms like workers compensation, 75 limited auto
accident payments,7 6  coal miner black lung disease
compensation, 77 and tide-over relief for crime victims7 8 have been
very limited. Both national and state legislatures are skeptical
of any government expansion of payment for the injured except
in a national no-fault social security system. 79
VII. CONCLUSION
Moderate rather than radical changes in our litigation
system are what you should expect. The mountains will only
slightly erode into the valleys. Our present litigation model is
not as plaintiff-friendly or as litigation-heavy as some believe it
to be. As to the near future, indications are that incentives and
opportunities for plaintiffs to litigate will continue to decrease
slightly, favoring defendants. There is just a hint of a shift in
American litigation towards the more conservative models of
England, Europe, and Japan.
74 See generally THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF
TORT LAW 67 (2001) (noting that the "inherent flexibility of tort law allows it to
mediate social inequities as they arise"); Jack B. Weinstein, Compensating Large
Numbers of People for Inflicted Harms, 11 DUKE J. OF COMP. & INT'L LAW 165, 177
(2001).
75 See, e.g., N.Y. WORKERS' COMP. LAW §§ 1-355 (McKinney 1992-1994).
76 See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 5201 (McKinney 2000) (establishing a state-created
not-for-profit corporation that pays no-fault claims to pedestrians when they cannot
recover from the vehicular operators who harmed them).
77 See, e.g., Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977, as
amended, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-45 (2000).
78 See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 620-35 (McKinney 1996).
79 See Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund, 42 U.S.C. § 401 (2002); see also,
Louis Uchitelle, Laid Off Workers Swelling the Cost of Disability Pay: Most From
Low End Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2002, at Al.
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